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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

-

BRINGiNG THnm PARTiES imo- Acrnos -AT LAw-ST-o. AGAINST TKZ
AssixooL-It frequently happens, in an action by an assignee, that.the defendant wishes to use as a cross-action a claim against the'assignor. This results
Sin no diffiulty -unless the amount -ofthe set-off against the atsignor is greater.
than the claimof the plaintiff, or unless the cross-action calls for a specific
remedy against the assignei in addition to its itefensive effect upon the plaintiff's demand: In each of these cases we 'have a three-sided controversy.
In the first, the set-off operates against the plaintiff to thv extent of his
claim and against'the assignor for the balance.' In the second, the crossaction operates against the plaintiff avd his assignor in ways which may be
quite variously' differeht.- If the assignor can- he brought into the contioversy, it can be wholly determined in a single action; otherwise two or more
actiops are necessary.

In State ex rel. Alaka Pacific Navigation Co. v. Superior Court (Wash.
1920), 194 Pac. 412, there was an- example of the first of these two casme
The plaintiff was assignee-of an account solely for collection and. claimed
no beneficial interest .init. The defendant had a cross-demand against the
assignor arising out of the same.contract -which produced the account -- ed
-upon, and this cross-demand exceeded the amount of the plaintiff's claim.
It was obvious that the defendant could not get a judgment for a balance in
his favor against the plaiqtiff, but that this could-be obtained, if at all, only
-against the assignor. Under a familiar statute -providing that where a complete determiation of the controversy cannot be had without the. presence
of other parties, the court shall cause them to be brought in, the detendant
asked that the action be stayed until the assignor- should be brought in.
Refusal to make this order was affirmed on appeal, the court' holding that
this. statute referred -to.necessary parties in the technical sense of that term,
and in an action at law, where the defendant makes *use of a legal counter-claim, no third party can be*necessary.
The point of interest in this declsion'is not so much whether it -s right
on.authority as whether it can be justified on broad principles of procedural
policy. - It brings up several interesting questions affecting the nature of
actions and the relation of parties thereio, and illustrates the extreme antipathy with which professional, conservatism meets proposals for even the
most nmitural and simple.changes in judicial administration.
z. We have here a three-sided legal controversy. The common law
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'was in theory wedded'to the idea of a two-sided controversy as the essential
condition for judicial action. One plaintiff or a unified group of joint plaintiffs must sue a single defendant or a unified group of joint defendants.
This principle lies at the foundation'of the whole scheme of parties in common law actions. In the case of two plaifitiffs, if their interests are several
they cannot bring a single action to enfofce their rights,* thus developing a
three-sided controversy, but each must bring a separate two-sided action.
GouwL oN P-iP. i, -Ch. IV, Sec. 53. In case of two defendants, if their
liability is several, each must be- a sole defendot in a- separate two-siditd
action, "nd both cannot be joined in a three-sided controversy. .30 Cvc. Z=o.
If this doctrine of unity -of parties is based on the- idea of preserving
singleness in the issue, the -effort is -vain, because- by the use of numerous
counts and pleas-many issues may arise in a single action. If it is based on
the supposed impossibility of splitting up a judgment so as to determine a
controversy with more than two sides,.it 'may be answered that the common
law did in fact tolirate judgments -which -determined legal relations among
three or more parties. In Seymour v. Richardson Fueling Co. (19o3), a05

Ill. 77, the court quotes .inany common%-aw authorities in support of the

proposition that while the general rule is that the judgment.must be a unit..
as to all, the defendauts in assumpsit, yet "if one' defendant pleads matter

which goes to lis personal discharge, such as banlcuptcy, or, to his ersonal
disability to contract, such as infancy, o" any other matter which does not
go to thL nature of the w'it," judgment may b6 rendered for such defendant
and againit the rest. So; ivhe e two or more are charged with a joint tort.
one inay -be found guilty and anothei acquitted,: as the evidence may require
SCHITrY ON PLZADING, *74. And even in the case of joint plaintiffs, where
they ire united tfirough a common interest, one-may obtain a judgment in
his favor while another' fails. x5 STAND. Elcfvc. oF PocZDu,. Si. In A1f
'these cases the judgment -does in fact determine a controversy with three or
more sides.
It must fie concluded, therefore, that three-sided controversies have
forced. themselves within thi jurisdiction of common law courts, and thai
the fact that in the principal- case the presence 'cf. the- assigndr would complicafe the issues and call for a judgment settling a triangular controversy.
is'no justification in prinicile for the decision.
2. In the principal case the third party sought to be brought irX was
not involved in the original- action, but in a crosi-action. Ir' so'far as ibis
cross-action operated as a defense, thus corresponding to the common law
recoupment, it was fully available to the defendant without the presence of
a third party. But if it was to be used at its full. value, resulting in a judgment for the. balance in defendant's favor, the assignor had to he before the
court.
Now, in such case, in order-to prevent obvious injustice, the usual rules
of common law procedure -cannot be permitted to operate. One of two
things must be done. Either the third party must be allowed to come into
the case, and the liability 'apportioned between the assignee and assignor,
which is contrary to orthodox practice; or the defendant must be authorized
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to split his cause of action and use part of it to extinguish the plaintiff's
demand and the balance as a. separate claim against -the assignor, to be
asserted in a separate suit, which is also contrary to the orthodox rule, which
prohibits splitting a cause of action. From the standpoint of convenience it
is clear that bringing in the third party, when it .can be done, is the better
method. The common law, however, with its technical distrust of simplicity,
chose the other method. Confronted by a dilemma which- inevitably called
for -the sacrifice of traditional conventions" i one direction or the other, the
single action with three parties was passed by in favor of two separate
actions each with two parties, on the two portiens of the split demand. Hexnell.v. Fairlamb (18Oo), 3 Esp. 104; 1 CMoPuS JU2t, 1111.
The principal case is therefore in harmony with the common law solution, but no reason exists in principle why.courts should not. in the exercise
of common la* powers, all6w either solution as the occasion requires. The
courts were forced, in this situation, to do something on their own authority,
without. statutory aid, and they assumed jurisdiction. If they had power to
adopt one plan, there was equal power to adopt the other. Why should all
subsequent courts continue to follow the accidental lead of thiat ,;riginal
choice of a remedial alternative?
3. The usual American counterclaim statute does not expressly authorize
a cross-demand which involves new parties, is commonly construed to carry
no implied authority to pleiad such a demand, and often forbids it in terms.
SuNDo.L4X,
CAses ox CoDe PiZADiNc, 356-364; Taylor v. Matteson (i8ft),
86,Wis. xx3. A very fevw have provided expressly for bringing in new parties. Kansas St., igo9, Secs. 56.
694. The most striking development in
this field has been the new Cnxm PNt.A'.cc Act adopted in New York in x93o,
See. 271, which contains the following provision:
"Where a defendant sets up any counterclaim which raises questions between .himself and the plaintiff along with any- other persons,
he shall set forth the names of all persons who, if such counterclaim
were to be enforced by cross-action, would be defendants in such crossaction. When any such person is not a party to the action he shall
be summoned to appear b13being served with a copy of the answer.
A person not a party to the action wlo is so served with an answer
becomes a defendant in.the action as if he had been served with the
summons.'Under the English practice it has long been customary to bring in third
-parties on counterclaims-Ont 2s, rule 12; and several British provinces
have similar rules. Nova Scotia, Jun. AcT, z92o, Sec. 18(3), and ORnMa 21,
rule ii; Ontario, JuD. AcT, Rule £13. The principal case is a good illustration of. the utility of such a provision, which would, in this instance, have
allowed the whole controversy to be settled i., a single action. The English
practice provides a safeguard against the inconvenient use of the privilege
of bringing in third parties; by permitting the third party, when summoned,
to show cause why the claim should be prosecuted by a'separat6stit, ard the
judge nay make such order as way be just. OWZRta 21, rule 15-
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4. The effort made in the principal case on the part of the defendamt
to -secure an order bringing in the assignor under the general statute authorizing new parties who are necessaty to a complete determination of the controversy, was doomed to failure under the commonly accepted interpretation
of that statute. It has been held to apply only to equitable causes of action
or cross-demands. Chapman v. Forbes (i8go), 123 N. Y. 538. In the principal case the court distinguished State cx rtl Adjustment Co. v. Superior
Court, 67 Wash. 35S, on the gronnd that there the counterclaim was not a
mere money demand aaginst" the assignee, but an equitable defense calling
for affirmative relief., Another case where the assignor was brought in on
a counterclaim pleaded against the assignee is Gildirsrfeve v. Burrot.s (igy3),
24 Ohio St. 204, where the counterclaim was an equitable set-off. To be sure,
the statute contiins no express restriction to equitable actions and crossdemands, but the inevitable tendency to limit The scope of procedural innovations has fixed this implied restriction.
S. The. whole question of third partics coming into actions at law has
received a broad and generous stimulus in England and some of the Bhitisb
dominions through- rules authorizing so-called Third Party Proecedu,
whereby. any defendant entitled to contribution or indemnity over againt
any other person not a party to the action may by- leave of cort brng so&
party in, and thereby have the whole controver-y, inclpding the indenity
or contribution, settled in a single action. England, ODvc 16, rule 4& Te
practice is widely employed and has demonstrated its great utility.
6. It is apparent that the principal case, while rightly decided under the
current authorities, exhibits the very low state of procedural dewelopment
from which we suffer in this 'country, and suggests the need of both a more
progressive attitude on the part of our courts- and a more.enhightened legis-R.XS.
lative policy.

